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Abstract: Recently economists have become interested in why people who face 
social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of 
punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary 
microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment.  We survey these 
theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the 
theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators 
indiscriminately explains punishment best. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Economists have become interested in analyzing, in the experimental lab, 
something known to field researchers for quite a while, that people who face 
social dilemmas (i.e. situations in which group and individual incentives are at 
odds) sometimes control free riding locally by the use of social, economic, and/or 
physical sanctions.
1   The existence of schemes by which people monitor each 
other and punish those who free ride is problematic for standard economic theory. 
Why?  First, in non-repeated interactions, any theory assuming that agents 
simply want to maximize their material gain can not reconcile the cooperative 
behavior needed to obtain socially efficient outcomes because free riders always 
do better.  Free riding when others contribute avoids the costs associated with 
contributing yet returns the benefits of cooperation and free riding when others 
free ride prevents one from being taken advantage of.  Hence, no self-interested 
person would ever cooperate.  The same argument can be made for not punishing 
free riders because punishment, in this context, is just a second-order social 
dilemma (see Boyd and Richerson, 1992).  Those people who don’t punish avoid 
the costs of doing so, but share any benefits associated with the punishment 
inflicted by others. 
  Understanding punishment in social dilemma games has become an 
interdisciplinary endeavor with theories being offered that have economic, 
evolutionary psychological, and biological foundations.  In this paper we explain 
each theory and discuss data from experiments and surveys to evaluate their 
behavioral relevance. 
  We begin, in section 2, by providing microfoundations for punishing 
behavior by building a simple model of the evolution of behavior in an 
institutional environment that permits the monitoring and sanctioning of free 
riders.  From this model we identify two types of punishers: those who punish 
free riders in their groups and those who punish free riders outside their 
                                            
1 Economic punishment experiments include Fehr and Gaechter (2000), Bochet et al. 
(2003), Bowles et al. (2001), Carpenter (2002b), Carpenter and Matthews (2002), Masclet 
et al. (2003), and Sefton et al. (2000).  Relevant field research is summarized in Ostrom 
(1990) and Ostrom et al. (1994).  A specific example of field research is Acheson (1988).   3
immediate group.  In section 3 we describe three theories that have been 
developed to explain why punishment occurs in experiments with structures 
similar to our stylized model.  In section 4 we describe various sources of data 
which we use to evaluate each theory.  We conclude in section 5 by discussing 
the support each theory finds in the data. 
 
2.  The Evolution of Punishing Behaviors 
 
For simplicity, imagine a two-person social dilemma modeled on the widely used 
experimental game, the voluntary contribution mechanism (Isaac et al., 1984), in 
which agents are given 50 experimental monetary units (EMUs) and allowed to 
either contribute to a public good or keep the money for themselves.
2  If a player 
contributes, her money is multiplied by a factor of 1.5 and shared equally with 
the other group member.  If she doesn’t contribute, i.e. she free rides, she keeps 
her 50 EMUs and may receive another 37.5 EMUs if the other person contributes.  
Clearly, free riding is the dominant strategy. 
 
2.1 Microfoundations for Ingroup Punishment 
Now we introduce punishment using a mechanism that is also consistent 
with the protocols used in most punishment experiments.  At a cost of 1 EMU 
players can buy a 2 EMU reduction in the other player’s payoff.  For simplicity 
we make both the contribution and punishment decisions binary; players 
contribute all 50 EMUs or none and they spend either 10 EMUs to punish a free 
rider or nothing.  We also restrict the strategy space to those behavioral types 
that we actually see with any regularity in the experimental lab.  Essentially, this 
means that, while free riders occasionally punish cooperators, they do so rarely 
enough that we restrict the ability to punishment to cooperators.  This gives us 
three behavioral types: Free Riders who neither contribute nor punish, 
Cooperators who contribute but never punish, and Punishers who contribute and 
punish free riders in their groups.  The normal form of this game is presented in 
                                            
2 Because our purpose is to evaluate different theories of punishment, the model we 
present here is a shorter, simplified version of the model developed in Carpenter and 
Matthews (2002).   4
Figure 1.  Each player has two components to her strategy, a contribution 
decision and, if she contributes and her partner free rides, a punishment decision.
3 
The stage game has only one subgame perfect equilibrium that does not 
include punishment.  As mentioned above, punishment is a second-order public 
good meaning players can do better by free riding off any punishment doled out 
by other players.  Further, punishment is an incredible threat because it is costly 
to engage in and therefore not punishing dominates punishing.  Knowing 
punishment is dominated, free riders should not fear it and therefore the subgame 
perfect equilibrium is where players free ride and do not punish.  However, 
subgame perfection is a very restrictive refinement.  We now examine the 
implications of evolutionary dynamics that sometimes select other, more intuitive 
Nash equilibria. 
We describe the evolution of behavioral types in this population using 
the familiar replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978).  At each moment in 
continuous time, nature randomly assigns two people from a large population to 
play our game.  Under this dynamic, behavioral types succeed in the population 
to the extent that they do better or worse than the average agent.  Where 
S={FR, C, P} is the set of allowed strategies, pi,t is the fraction of players using 
strategy i in period t, and πi,t is the current payoff of using strategy i in the 
population, the average payoff to all strategies in period t is: 
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which expressed as a difference equation is just: 
 
                                            
3 Note this game is a version of “norms game” described in Sethi (1996), which is based on 
















Because the denominator of the right side of the equation does not affect 
the value of the zeros of the dynamic (only the speed to an equilibrium), it is 
standard to focus on the numerator only.  In the limit, as the difference between 
t and t+1 becomes arbitrarily small, the discrete time dynamic collapses to the 
following continuous time derivative with rest points at all the Nash equilibria of 
the underlying game and asymptotically stable rest points containing only the 
evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) of the game. 
 
() ii i pp ππ =− !  
 
 Letting  π(i,j) be the payoff of playing strategy i against strategy j, 
calculating the expected payoffs of each behavioral type from the normal form 
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after substitution for the residual share pP=1-pC-pFR.   
Simulating the dynamic from different initial conditions will give us an 
idea of whether punishing behavior can survive selection.  Intuition says that 
punishing strategies can not successfully invade a free riding population because 
they are much more likely to be matched with a free rider than another punisher 
in which case they do worse (πP=27.5) than the average ( 50 π " ).  Likewise, 
because cooperators do not share the burden of punishing free riders and 
therefore cannot reduce their fitness, initial populations with too many   6
cooperators will be vulnerable to invasion by free riders because there are not 
enough punishers.  However, when punishers are significantly represented in the 
initial population, free riders are likely to be matched with one who reduces their 
payoffs.  Further, the high probability of being punished means the free rider’s 
payoff will be driven below the average which is now disproportionately weighted 
by interactions between types who cooperate with each other and therefore do 
not punish each other.  After the free riders are driven from the population there 
is no selection pressure against punishing types and the population shares 
stabilize.  These dynamics are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. 
  As one can see, figure 2 illustrates the case in which there are too many 
cooperators and not enough punishers in the starting distribution of types.   
Initially, cooperators increase in the population because they free ride on the 
punishment doled out by the punishers, but punishers do poorly relative to 
cooperators and wane in the population.  At some point, the number of punishers 
falls to a level at which free riding takes off in the population and after a short 
while the population fixes at the all free riding subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
There is a second component of (non-perfect) Nash equilibria, however, 
in which players mix between cooperation with and without punishment such 
that the probability of the former is at least 62.5%.  In terms of our evolutionary 
model, this corresponds to a polymorphism in which all individuals are 
contributors and most are prepared to punish free riding.  The component is (at 
least) a weak attractor, as illustrated in figure 3, where, for the specified initial 
conditions, the distribution stabilizes at about three-quarters punishers and one-
quarter cooperators.  The intuition is that with enough punishers around, free 
riders are very likely to be punished and they, therefore, do worse than 
cooperators and the many punishers who interact with other punishers or 
cooperators.  Furthermore, it can be shown that elements of this components are 
“drift compatible” in the sense of Binmore and Samuelson (1999).
4 
                                            
4  The reader should not be worried that these theoretical results are in some sense 
“rigged” by restricting the set of strategies as we have done.  Our results are consistent 
with those found in the models discussed in the papers listed in footnote 3 which allow 
various other strategies.  Again, our current purpose is to motivate the evolutionarily 
viability of punishing strategies not to provide a canonical proof of their existence.   7
  So far our model provides evolutionary microfoundations for punishing 
behavior within a group.  The first two theories of punishment in social dilemma 
experiments were developed to explain the reasons for this punishing behavior.  
We describe these theories in detail in the next section, but before that discussion 
we will develop our model further to illustrate foundations for the third theory of 
punishment. 
 
2.2 Microfoundations for Generalized Punishment 
  Now imagine that nature randomly selects four agents at a time instead 
of two to populate two two-person groups playing the game in figure 1 in parallel.  
The two public goods are symmetric, but players derive benefits only from the 
public good provided within their own two-person group.  So far, the structure 
provides the same equilibria as the baseline game.  However, now we let players 
punish free riders in both their own ingroup and in the other outgroup.  The 
question we are interested in is whether punishment strategies that are 
generalized (i.e., not group specific) can survive or proliferate within a social 
dilemma institutional structure.  More specifically, we wonder whether a simpler 
heuristic of contribute to your own public good and punish all free riders you see, 
regardless of group affiliation, is viable under very restrictive conditions in which 
players receive no benefit from punishing in another group, nor do they get 
higher payoffs in some boundedly rational sense because they conserve the 
cognitive cost of identifying ingroup and outgroup members. 
  After changing the structure of the game, we add two more behavioral 
types to account for the fact that players who cooperate can now punish free 
riders in both groups.  We call the first new type Pure Social Reciprocators 
because they contribute and punish outgroup free riders only.  Similarly, Social 
Reciprocators contribute and punish free riders in both groups.  We also suppose, 
for the sake of convenience, that contributors who punish cannot “pick and 
choose” which means that a contributor who punishes both in- and outgroup 
players and is matched with three free riders (one ingroup and two outgroup), for 
example, is assumed to punish all three. 
  Like our baseline game, the mini social reciprocity game has two Nash 
equilibria, but a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, in which no one contributes 
and no one punishes.  The second Nash equilibrium is another component in   8
which all players randomize over our four contribution strategies, such that the 
likelihood of punishment of free riding exceed some lower bound.  For details see 
Carpenter and Matthews (2002).  The expected payoffs are slightly more 
complicated in the mini social reciprocity game because one needs to account for 
the fact that free riders can now be punished by outgroup members and that 
punishers can spend 10, 20 or 30 EMUs on punishment.  However, the payoffs to 
the other contributing strategies are as straight forward as in the baseline game 
because intuition suggests that the expected payoffs of the contributing 
behavioral types in the mini social reciprocity game should be a function of the 

























It can also be shown that the payoff to free riding is: 
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Because free riders will sometimes do much worse than punishers, socially 
reciprocal strategies may evolve from certain initial conditions.  Figure 4 
illustrates the evolution of behavioral types from the initial state in which 40% of 
the population are free riders and the remaining strategies each comprise 15% of 
the population.  In this case there are too many free riders for punishment to 
take hold and despite the cooperators initially doing well by free riding on the 
punishers, free riders eventually take over the population. 
  In a balanced initial population, however, the four contributing types 
expect πC=67.5, πP=65.5, πPSR=63.5, and πSR=62.5, and free riders expect just 
πFR=56.  The mean payoff for the entire population is 63, which indicates that 
free riders and social reciprocators will fall short of the population mean, and see 
their numbers diminish, but the shares of the three other types of contributors 
will rise.  The surprise, perhaps, is that from this initial state, simulation of the 
replicator dynamic reveals that the free riders and not the social reciprocators,   9
will be driven to extinction.  The evolution of social reciprocity from balanced 
initial conditions is shown in figure 5.
5 
  A second important fact is illustrated in figure 5.  Not only do social 
reciprocators survive selection in a balanced population, so do punishers and 
cooperators.  Perhaps one of the most interesting results of this model is that it 
predicts a polymorphism of contributing strategies and this polymorphism is, 
more or less, what we see in the lab.  In an experiment that we discuss in section 
4, about a third of the participants consistently punish both outside and inside 
their groups, about half punish ingroup only, and the remaining 20% effectively 
never punish at all. 
 
3.  Why Punish? 
 
Section 2 established that punishing strategies may survive in a population, but 
the models say nothing about why people punish.  There are three theories that 
have been developed to provide the motivation for (or the psychology of) 
punishment.  The common starting point for each theory is the fact that 
punishing behaviors are grounded in the evolutionary logic provided in section 2.  
With respect to our model, the first two theories are represented by the 
behavioral type we call punishers.  The third theory can explain punishers and 
the two socially reciprocal behavioral types.  However, the theories differ on two 
dimensions: the degree to which punishment is believed to be a purposeful act 
versus a normative response and the discretion that is attributed to punishers in 
terms of who to punish.   
 
3.1 Fitness Differential Theory (Price et al. 2002) 
  Price et al. (2002), hereafter PCT, have developed the fitness differential 
theory based on the seemingly obvious assertion (as PCT point out) that no pro-
social behavior can evolve in a population of free riders unless cooperative types 
                                            
5 As in the simple model, different initial conditions will be associated with different 
elements of the component and some of these are drift-compatible.   10
somehow recover or eliminate the benefits of free riding.
6  Therefore punishment, 
according to PCT, arises to tax away the benefits accruing to free riders.   
Specifically, PCT assert that punishment evolves as a punitive sentiment which is 
a desire that the target of the sentiment be harmed.  This sentiment is 
hypothesized to be “hard-wired” into our motivational circuitry.  This hard-wired 
sentiment causes game players to punish free riders even when it is material 
costly to do so. 
  PCT also point out that such a punitive sentiment could evolve in 
response to two possible problems faced by humans in the late Pleistocene: to 
increase contributions to collective actions and to eliminate the fitness differential 
that free riders enjoy over cooperators.  Their data (discussed below) is consistent 
only with the hypothesis that game players punish to reduce the payoff 
advantage accruing to free riders. 
  PCT are good about proposing how to test whether the fitness 
differential theory works.  According to them (pp.210-211), the trigger for 
punitive sentiments is the fact that free riders do better materially than 
contributors.  Observationally, this means that a person’s contribution to a 
public good should correlate with their punitive sentiments because only those 
who contribute will potentially receive lower payoffs than free riders.   
Furthermore, the more that one contributes, the more likely one should be to 
punish and punishment should be directed exclusively from cooperators to free 
riders.  They also state that the relationship between willingness to punish and 
the willingness to contribute should be robust to the inclusion of other factors 
that might elicit punishment like the magnitude of the potential benefits from the 
public good being successfully provided. 
  At the same time, PCT argue that there should be no relationship 
between a willingness to reward contributions and one’s own contribution 
decision because rewarding under-providers restores the payoff differential that is 
suppose to trigger punitive sentiments.  Although ingroup and outgroup 
distinctions are not addressed in PCT, it is clear that payoff-concerned punishers 
                                            
6 It is not actually true that free rider benefits need to be taxed away for cooperation to 
evolve.  For example, assortative interactions allow for the evolution of cooperation by 
restricting access to the gains from cooperation.   11
would always choose ingroup punishment over outgroup punishment because 
spending resources to punish outgroup can only reduce one’s relative position 
within a group.  
 
3.2 Strong Reciprocity (Gintis, 2000) 
Reciprocity-based punishment behaviors are similar in phenotype to the 
behavior posited by PCT (free riders are punished and their fitness is reduced), 
but the reasons for acting are different.  People motivated to reduce fitness 
differentials are outcome-oriented while, we believe, reciprocators respond to the 
actions or intentions of others. 
One reciprocity-based theory, originating in Gintis (2000),  and discussed 
in the context of economic experiments in Gintis et al. (2003) shows that a 
behavior called strong reciprocity, which is a predisposition to cooperate and 
punish free riding at some personal cost within well-defined groups, even if the 
groups have uncertain futures.
7  According to the strong reciprocity theory, the 
trigger for punishment is the fact that free riders display ill intentions by 
violating the group-beneficial contribution norm not the fact that they accrue 
higher payoffs. 
Because strong reciprocators care about norm violations and the 
intentions of the people they play with more than payoffs, they should react 
differently to the costs of punishment than people who care mostly about payoff 
differentials.  For example, although strong reciprocators may be sensitive to the 
cost of punishing free riders, they should not care whether the punishment of a 
free rider causes her payoff to fall below the cooperator payoff.  In contrast, the 
fitness differential theory would suggest that players will only punish when doing 
so reduces the payoff of the free rider more than her own payoff. 
                                            
7 The model in Gintis (2000) is based on group selection wherein selection happens at both 
the group level and the individual level so that prosocial traits can evolve if they cause 
groups to expand and splinter off at rates greater then the internal decay caused by free 
riding.  However, our theoretical results in section 2 indicate that group selection is not 
required for the evolution of punishment strategies that are observationally equivalent to 
strong reciprocity.  This fact is also demonstrated in Bowles and Gintis (2003) where free 
riders are punished by being ostracized from the group.   12
Like the fitness differential theory, strong reciprocity is not equipped to 
explain the sort of cross-group dynamics we see in section 2.2.  Punishing 
outgroup doesn’t make sense when norms are defined over within-group behavior. 
 
3.3 Social Reciprocity (Carpenter and Matthews, 2002) 
A second reciprocity-based theory used to explain punishment is called 
social reciprocity.  This theory generalizes the notion of strong reciprocity to 
account for cooperation and punishment in the sort of large, amorphous, groups 
that constitute neighborhoods, for example.   
We define social reciprocity as the act of demonstrating one’s 
disapproval, at some personal cost, for the violation of a widely-held norm, 
regardless of the material consequences.  Social reciprocators, like strong 
reciprocators, are motivated more by intentions than by payoff differentials, but 
social reciprocators differ from strong reciprocators because they punish all norm-
violators regardless of group affiliation (recall our results in section 2.2). 
In everyday life, social reciprocity explains the sort of altruistic acts that 
social psychologists termed the responsive bystander phenomenon after the 
research of Bibb Latane and John Darley.  In one of their classic experiments, 
Latane and Darley (1970), subjects were brought into a room under the pretence 
of waiting for an interview to begin and paid their show-up fees.  However, also 
in the room was a confederate of the researchers who stole some of the left over 
show-up money when the experimenter left the room.  In 50% of the cases in 
which subjects report having seen the theft, they reported it to the experimenter.  
Notice that this is a costly act because the thief might retaliate and there is no 
expectation that the reporter will receive any benefit from doing so.  The idea of 
social reciprocity is that people will intervene at some cost to themselves when 
people break obvious rules, and they do so regardless of which group the norm-
violator belongs to or whether or not doing so will benefit the social reciprocator 
in any way. 
The description of social reciprocity indicates that if punishment is 
driven by this motivation, people will punish in two scenarios that differentiate 
them from fitness differential punishers and strong reciprocators.  First, social 
reciprocators (like strong reciprocators) will punish even when doing so will not 
remove the payoff differential that free riders achieve.  Second, unlike strong   13
reciprocators, social reciprocators will punish norm violations that occur outside 
their groups. 
 
3.4 Differentiating Theories of Punishment 
The differences in the three theories of punishment can be summarized 
using the following table.  There are two dimensions on which the theories differ.  
Two theories, strong reciprocity and social reciprocity, posit intentions that are 
based in the violation of prosocial norms while the fitness differential theory 
explains intentions in terms of wanting to eliminate the payoff differential 
achieved by free riders.  Hence, using data that sheds light on the motivations of 
punishers we can discriminate between the reciprocal theories and the fitness 
differential theory.   
 
  Punish Ingroup Only  Punish Ingroup and 
Outgroup 
Punish for Payoff Reasons  Fitness Differential 
Theory 
- 





On the other dimension, only social reciprocity explains punishment that 
happens outside of one’s immediate group.  Occurrences of out-group punishment 
are situations in which punishers or their groups can not receive any future 
benefits and free riders impose no costs directly on them.  In these situations 
fitness differential players would not punish because doing so would reduce their 
relative payoff within their own group.  The cost imposed on fitness differential 
players who punish outgroup reduces their relative payoff compared to both 
cooperators and free riders within their group and if free riders in the other group 
contribute more in the future, players in the other group will do better compared 
to the altruistic punisher.  In sum, fitness differential punishers would always do 
better by substituting ingroup punishment for outgroup punishment. Likewise, 
strong reciprocators would not punish because their behavior is theorized to be 
regulated by ingroup norms only. 
   14
4.  Survey and Experimental Evidence of Punishing 
Behaviors 
 
To test which theory of punishment is the most consistent with the existing data, 
we discuss the data from five surveys and experiments.  We do not attempt a 
comprehensive review of the punishment literature; instead our purpose is to 
discuss only those studies that tell us something about player motivations to 
punish free riders (in terms of outcomes versus norm violations) and those studies 
that test whether or not punishment generalizes beyond obvious group 
boundaries. 
 
4.1 The Survey of Price, Cosmides, and Tooby (2002) 
  PCT presented vignettes about the US going to war and needing to draft 
soldiers to 287 undergraduates to read and then asked them their opinions about 
four statements that had to do with their willingness to participate in the war, 
their willingness to punish free riders, their personal interest in the collective goal 
of winning the war, and their willingness to reward participants.  Both vignettes 
described warfare between the US and another country but, to balance the design, 
half the participants read an offensive vignette and the other half read a 
defensive vignette.  The vignettes and statements appear in the appendix. 
  According to the fitness differential theory, there should be a link 
between a respondent’s willingness to serve and her willingness to punish free 
riders because the more likely one is to serve, the larger one’s expected payoff will 
drop below a free rider (see section 3.1).  Indeed, PCT find uncontrolled 
correlations of 0.60 (p<0.001) and 0.65 (p<0.001) and partial correlations of 0.55 
(p<0.001) and 0.62 (p<0.001) when controlling for the respondent’s reported 
personal interest in the success of the war in the defensive and offensive scenarios, 
respectively.  This establishes a link between one’s willingness to contribute and 
one’s willingness to punish free riders. 
  PCT also posit that one’s willingness to participate should not predict 
one’s willingness to reward other contributors because rewarding other people can 
only increase fitness differentials.  This hypothesis fails the test of simple 
correlations (rho=0.12 and p<0.05 for both scenarios), but is resurrected when   15
the authors control for the respondent’s perceived interest in the war.  In the 
latter case, neither partial correlation is larger than 0.03 nor are they 
significantly different than zero. 
  The fact that participation predicts punishment and does not predict 
rewards in this survey study is the primary evidence offered by PCT to support 
their fitness differential theory. 
  
4.2 Mutual Monitoring Experiments 
  In the typical public goods experiment (e.g., Isaac et al., 1984), 
participants are randomly assigned to groups of four people, given an endowment 
of money, and given the opportunity to contribute as much of their endowments 
as they want to a public good.  The experiment usually lasts between ten and 
twenty rounds and the participants are either shuffled into new groups at the 
beginning of each round (the strangers treatment) or stay in the same groups for 
the entire experiment (the partners treatment).  The incentives are the same as 
those discussed in section 2 and do not depend on the grouping mechanism: each 
player has a dominant strategy to free ride on the contributions of the other 
players.  Specifically, the payoff function for players is: 
 
() () ii i wc m c π =−+ ∑  
 
where w is each players endowment, ci is the amount contributed by player i, and 
0<m<1 is the marginal per capita return on the public good.  Differentiating the 
individual return by ci indicates that free riding dominates, and differentiating 
the sum of the individual payoffs by the sum of the cis indicates that 
contributing is socially efficient – hence the game is a social dilemma. 
In a mutual monitoring experiment, a second stage is added to the game 
in which players are shown the (anonymous) contributions of the other group 
members and given the opportunity to punish them at some cost.  One such 
experiment is reported in Carpenter and Matthews (2002) in which 96 
undergraduates participated (24 in the mutual monitoring treatment) and earned 
$16.55, on average.  In this experiment players had a per-period endowment of 25 
EMUs, contributions returned 0.5 EMUs for each group member, and punishers   16
paid 1 EMU to destroy 2 EMUs of their target’s gross income for the period.  
Therefore, the payoff function becomes: 
 
(25 ) 0.5( ) 2 ii i i jj i cc p p π =− + − − ∑ ∑∑  
 
where pij is the punishment that player i inflicts on player j. 
The average contributions in this game are presented in Figure 6 
alongside the contributions in a control treatment in which punishment was not 
allowed.  As one can see, punishment tends to stabilize or increase initial 
contribution levels while contributions decline over time in the standard 
voluntary contribution game. 
  We can try to verify the PCT survey results by looking at the 
relationship between punishing and contributing in this experiment.  In the 
equations reported below the number of EMUs spent on punishment is regressed 
on the target’s level of free riding which is the number of EMUs the target kept 
normalized by the endowment and the punisher’s level of free riding.  Specifically, 
Punishmenti,j is the number of EMUs that punisher i spent to destroy j’s money, 
FreeRidej is a measure between zero and one of how much j free rode, and 
FreeRidei is how badly the punisher, i, free rode.  According to the fitness 
differential theory, the coefficient on FreeRidei should be positive and significant. 
The first equation is simple ordinary least squares.  Here we see a strong 
relationship between free riding and being punished (p<0.001), but no significant 
relationship between contributing one’s self and punishing others (p=0.41), 
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However, controlling for individual heterogeneity over time with random effects 
and accounting for the fact that punishment can not be less than zero using the 
Tobit estimator in the second regression, the coefficient on the punisher’s 
FreeRide regressor increases substantially.  Despite this increase in the coefficient, 
the effect is still only marginally significant (p=0.09) indicating a weak 
relationship, at best.  In sum, we find only weak support for the fitness 
differential theory in laboratory data. 
 
4.3 A Team Production Survey 
  Because the PCT survey data is at odds with our laboratory data, we 
conducted another vignette study that was framed in a way that we thought 
would be more realistic for participants.  In our survey, participants responded to 
statements about a vignette that described a team production scenario in which 
someone free rides. The vignette and the relevant statements appear in the 
appendix. 
  Our 70 participants were undergraduates at Middlebury College.  Each 
participant was randomly given one version of our survey.  In total there were six 
versions of the survey that balanced the sequence in which the scenario and the 
questions were presented to remove any order effects.  We asked the participants 
a few demographic questions, had them read the team production vignette in 
which one member of a team free rides, and then had them respond to 
statements about the vignette.  Two statements are import for our current 
purpose.  The first we will call Punish, asked the participants if they would 
intervene, even if it were costly to do so, to stop a person from free riding.  The 
second statement called Norm versus Payoff asked respondents the degree to 
which they agreed with a statement that said they were more likely to punish 
free riders because of normative reasons than because of payoff reasons.
8 
                                            
8 We also balanced this statement by switching its order in half the cases so that 
it read, “ I would be more likely to confront the team member who did not work 
because I will reduce the benefits he gets from not working than because he broke 
an unstated rule” instead of “I would be more likely to confront the non-working 
team member because he broke an unstated rule than because I will reduce the 
benefits he gets from not working.”   18
  Ninety percent of our respondents said they would confront the free rider 
to some extent.  In reality, this number would probably be smaller, but if the 
hypothetical nature of this question emboldens everyone to the same degree, we 
can still learn something about people’s motivations from this data because we 
are mostly interested in explaining the variation in responses.  Because our 
questions were marked on a likert scale we use ordered logit regressions to 
analyze the variance in people’s stated willingness to punish free riders.  The 
results are summarized in regression 3: 
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0.30 0.23 0.51 0.43           (3)
             (0.14)       (0.25)        (0.53)             (0.43)
70, pseudo  0.11,  13.69








NvP is the extent to which the respondent said they were more influenced by 
norm breaking than by reducing the free riders payoff, EcClasses is the number 
of economics classes the respondent had taken, and the other two controls are 
self-explanatory. 
  As one can see, not much difference in responses is explained by the 
controls.  Older participants are more likely to punish, women are less likely to 
punish, and studying economics is associated with reducing one’s prosocial 
tendencies (as was also demonstrated in Carter and Irons, 1991), but none of 
these effects is significant.  However, people who say they are motivated more by 
norms than by the payoff differential accruing to free riders are more likely to 
punish (p=0.03).  This evidence favors the normative theories of punishment over 
the payoff differential theory. 
 
4.4 The Demand for Punishment 
  In Carpenter (2002a) and Anderson and Putterman (2003) the authors 
look at the effect on punishing behavior of changing the ratio of how much 
punishment costs to how much it harms the target.  These experiments are 
particularly useful because they include treatments in which the price of 
punishment is very high and therefore the cost to punish is larger than the harm 
inflicted on free riders.  These treatments allow us to differentiate among the two 
reasons for punishment using experimental data.  Clearly, players who are   19
motivated to reduce fitness or payoff differentials would never punish when the 
cost to harm ratio is greater than one.  Therefore, the fitness differential theory 
predicts that the demand for punishment will fall to zero when the cost to harm 
ratio rises above one.  However, while strong and social reciprocators may be 
price sensitive, they will still punish despite the high price and should therefore 
have smooth demand functions. 
  Because the two experiments provide very similar results, we consider 
only the data from Carpenter (2002a) which we have access to.  In this 
modification of the mutual monitoring experiment described in section 4.2, the 
price of destroying one EMU of another player varies according to the following 
two sequences: {4,2,1,0.5,0.25} or {0.25,0.5,1,2,4}.  The first sequence represents 
the decreasing price treatment and the second sequence represents the increasing 
price treatment.  There were 72 participants who earned approximately $26 each.  
Half the participants played the decreasing price game and the other half played 
the increasing price game to balance any order effects.  The experiment was 15 
periods long which means that the participants were exposed to each price for 
three periods. 
  The estimate of the demand for punishment appears as regression (4).
9  
In this case, all the regressors are highly significant.  Punishment is ordinary and 
normal, players avoid punishment by contributing more, cooperators punish more, 
and punishment falls when group contributions are increasing ( i c ∆ ∑ is the 




0.75 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.01           (4)
                          (0.13)         (0.02)             (0.02)     (0.02)    (0.005)
1080,  205
ij i j i i Punishment Price Income c c c
nW a l d
ε
χ





  The coefficient on ci is consistent with the fitness differential theory – 
cooperators punish more, but notice that this result is also consistent with either 
of the reciprocity theories which state that it is the cooperators that punish norm 
violators.  Therefore we can not use this result to discriminate among theories.  
                                            
9 This regression is a random effects tobit.   20
Also notice that punishment is decreasing in its price, but we can not tell from 
regression (4) whether it falls to zero beyond the cost to harm ratio of one. 
  To examine whether punishment falls two zero when the cost is greater 
than the harm it imposes, Figure 7 presents averages of the ratio of the 
punishment purchased over the number of EMUs kept for each price level.  We 
divide punishment by the amount kept to control (removing the few cases which 
involve division by zero) for the target’s level of free riding.  As one can see, the 
average amount of punishment does mostly decrease as the cost to harm ratio 
increases, but it does not fall to zero at the price of one where one can not 
remove a fitness differential by punishing.  In fact, in each price treatment the 
average punishment per EMU kept is significantly greater than zero at better 
than the 0.01 level indicating that punishment does not fall to zero at any price. 
  The demand for punishment data does not support the fitness differential 
theory because people appear willing to punish even when it costs them more to 
do so than the amount of harm they inflict on the target.  This fact, however, is 
consistent with the reciprocity-based theories of punishment.  Calculating the 
price elasticity of demand for punishment at the regressor means yields a value of 
–0.64 indicating that, while the demand for punishment is downward sloping, it is 
relatively inelastic.  This fact supports the normative theories of punishment 
because it suggests that people punish without much regard to the price of doing 
so. 
 
4.5 A Social Reciprocity Experiment 
  The social reciprocity experiment is based on the mini social reciprocity 
game described in section 2.2.  It differs from the standard mutual monitoring 
game because players can monitor and punish players in completely separate 
groups, as well as, players in their own groups.  In this experiment, discussed in 
detail in Carpenter and Matthews (2002), two groups of four participants play a 
voluntary contribution game in parallel.  Group members only benefit from 
contributions to their own, separate, public goods, but at the end of the 
contribution stage each player is shown the contribution decisions of all eight 
participants in the session and can destroy the earnings of any person that they 
want to at a cost of one-half EMU per EMU destroyed. At the end of each period, 
players are shown how much they earned from their own public good, reminded   21
how much they spent on punishment, and shown how much they themselves were 
punished.  However, if they were punished, they did not know whether it came 
from within their group or from the other group.  This feature was added to 
remove any retaliatory or strategic reasons for future punishment. 
  There is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the mini social 
reciprocity experiment that does not include any punishment.  We already know 
that players have no incentive to punish within their groups.  Because there is no 
possibility for a return from punishment in the other “outgroup,” egoistic 
preferences would preclude punishing players outgroup too.  Again, because 
punishing is strictly dominated, free riders need not fear it and, therefore, we 
should expect complete free riding and no punishment in- or outgroup. 
  Remember that fitness differential punishers or strong reciprocators will 
never punish outside their groups which means that any outgroup punishment 
can only be explained by social reciprocity.  Fifty-six Middlebury College 
undergrads participated in the social reciprocity treatment in 14 groups and 7 
sessions.  The social reciprocity contribution levels compared to the mutual 
monitoring game and the no-punishment control are presented in Figure 8.   As 
one can see, the social reciprocity game elicits the highest contributions and, 
pooling across periods, the contribution levels are statistically significant in each 
game.
10  
  There is a good reason why contributions are higher in the social 
reciprocity experiment – there is more punishment per act of free riding.  Fifty 
percent of our social reciprocity participants punished outside their group at least 
once.  Figure 9 summarizes the expenditures levels of people who punish free 
riders.  It appears that there is more money spent on punishment in the mutual 
monitoring treatment than on ingroup punishment in the social reciprocity game, 
but remember that contributions were lower in that game and, therefore, 
punishment was needed more.  The second thing to notice about punishment 
expenditures is that people in the social reciprocity game spend more money 
                                            
10 This assertion is based on pairwise means tests and cumulative distribution 
tests.  The smallest t-value was 3.95 and the lowest Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic was 0.16 (p<0.01).   22
punishing ingroup than outgroup.
11  However, the most important result, for our 
current purposes, is that outgroup punishment is significantly different from 
zero.
12  Only social reciprocity can explain the behavior of half the participants 
who punish outgroup and we know this behavior is not error-driven because 
expenditures on outgroup punishment are positive in each period.
13 
  At the end of the social reciprocity experiment we asked people why they 
punished outside their groups.  Figure 10 graphs the distribution of responses.  
Respondents could choose between altruistic reasons (i.e., punish to increase the 
contributions in the other group), reciprocal reasons (i.e., punish to get back at 
rule breakers), or both reasons.  Only 14 percent punish for altruistic reasons.  
The majority of people (56%) punish purely for normative reasons, and 86% of 
punishment is motivated to some degree by normative concerns. 
 
5.  Reconciling the Punishment Data with Theory 
 
We have summarized and provided theoretical microfoundations for three 
theories of punishment in public goods experiments.  The three theories differ on 
at least two dimensions: the extent to which punishment is motivated by payoff 
concerns versus normative concerns and whether or not the theory can explain 
punishment that crosses clear group boundaries.  The fitness differential theory of 
Price et al. (2002) posits people punish to remove the payoff differential accruing 
to free riders and therefore people motivated by these differentials should punish 
free riders in their groups only when doing so removes the added payoff they 
receive.  Strong reciprocity (Gintis (2000), asserts that people punish free riders 
without much regard to the cost of punishment to enforce pro-social cooperation 
norms.  This means the strong reciprocators punish rule breakers, but only within 
their groups.  Social reciprocity, developed first in Carpenter and Matthews 
(2002), is a generalization of strong reciprocity that says the people subscribe to 
                                            
11 Pooling the data across periods yields t=2.15, p=0.03 and ks=0.03, p=0.03. 
12 t=8.57, p<0.01. 
13 This sort of outgroup punishment appears to be very robust.  It has recently 
been replicated in a distribution game.  See Fehr and Fischbacher (2003).   23
the simpler heuristic of punishing all norm violators, regardless of group 
affiliation. 
  To assess which theory describes behavior best, we have presented the 
data from five studies.  The fitness differential theory is consistent with the 
fewest of these sources of data.  Strong reciprocity performs better than the 
fitness differential theory, but only social reciprocity is consistent with all the 
data presented.  Price et al. note that fitness differential punishers will be 
cooperators who direct punishment at free riders because cooperators receive 
lower payoffs that free riders.  However, if reducing payoff differentials is the 
motivation for punishment, fitness-minded punishers will only punish when the 
cost of doing so is lower than the harm inflicted on the target.  We have found 
that in at least two sets of data punishment is doled out primarily by cooperators, 
however, we also see that the price elasticity of punishment is relatively low 
indicating that people do not based their punishment decisions primarily on the 
ratio of cost to harm inflicted.  In addition, when put “head to head” in a survey 
similar to the original Price et al. survey, normative reasons for punishment 
explain much more of the variance in behavior that do payoff reasons.  Overall, 
the only support for the fitness differential theory is the fact that most 
punishment comes from cooperators and it is directed at free riders. 
  Both strong reciprocity and social reciprocity are consistent with 
punishment coming from cooperators and directed at free riders because free 
riders are seen as norm violators and contributors are norm enforcers.  Strong 
reciprocity and social reciprocity are also consistent with the fact that people 
punish free riders when the costs exceed the harm done to the target.  However, 
only social reciprocity can explain the data described in section 4.5.  In this 
experiment players have the opportunity to monitor and sanction people in 
different, distinct, groups and about half of the players do so. Hence, social 
reciprocity is the most parsimonious and robust theory of punishment. 
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6.  Appendix 
 
6.1 The Price, Cosmides, and Tooby (2002) Vignettes and Statements 
 
Defensive Scenario: Imagine that a few years from now, the Russian people elect 
a new, warlike dictator who claims that Alaska should rightfully belong to Russia.  
Under this dictator, Russia invades and conquers Alaska.  There is good evidence 
that Russia also intends to conquer more US territory, in addition to Alaska.  In 
response to the invasion, the USA declares war on Russia.  But because the war 
was unexpected, the USA has allowed its army to get relatively small, and it 
must start drafting US citizens in order to have a chance of winning the war. 
How would you feel about the war? 
 
Offensive Scenario: Imagine that several years from now, several oil-rich Middle 
Eastern countries get together and decide that to increase profits, they will 
dramatically raise the price of their oil.  This price increase devastates US 
industry and causes high inflation in the USA.  US gas prices triple, and several 
US oil companies go bankrupt.  After talks with these Middle Eastern countries 
fail, the USA declares war on them.  But the war was unexpected, so the USA 
has allowed its army to get relatively small, and it must start drafting US 
citizens in order to have a chance of victory. How would you feel about the war? 
 
- If the USA won this war, it would be very good for me as an individual. 
- If I got drafted, I would probably agree to serve. 
- If a US citizen resisted this draft, I think they should be punished. 
- If a drafted US citizen agreed to serve in the war, I’d think they should be 
rewarded. 
 
6.2 A Team Production Vignette Study 
 
You and a number of other newly hired people are employed by an auto 
manufacturer and assigned to work in teams of four.  Everyone on the team is 
paid equally and the pay level is determined entirely by how many cars your 
work team produces.  On the first day of work, you and the other three members   25
of your team divide up the production tasks equally.  Over the course of the next 
month, you and two other members of your group work regularly and hard.   
However, the fourth member of the team often hides in a storage room and reads 
a book instead of working on cars.  This means the other three of you must work 
harder to make the same number of cars as the other four-person teams. At the 
end of the month, you and everyone else in your group earn the same amount of 
money. 
 
- Although it might be costly, I would confront the team member who did not work. 
- I would be more likely to confront the non-working team member because he 
broke an unstated rule than because I will reduce the benefits he gets from not 
working.   26
7.  Tables and Figures 
 
 Free  Ride  Cooperate  Punish 
Free Ride  50, 50  87.5, 37.5  67.5, 27.5 
Cooperate  37.5, 87.5  75, 75  75, 75 
Punish  27.5, 67.5  75, 75  75, 75 
 
 
Figure 1:  The Normal Form of the Social Dilemma with Punishment Game. 
 









Figure 2:  Punishment and Cooperation Can Not Invade a Population of Free 
Riders. 









Figure 3:  The Evolution of Punishing Behavior From a Balanced Population. 
 











Figure 4:  The Dynamics of the Social Reciprocity Game with too many Free 
Riders. 
 


































































Figure 6:  Average Contribution Rates in the Mutual Monitoring Public Goods 
Game (source: Carpenter & Matthews, 2002). 
 










































Figure 7:  The Effect of Changing the Price of Punishment (source: Carpenter,  
2002). 
 



















































Figure 8:  Contributions in the Social Reciprocity Experiment (source: 
Carpenter & Matthews, 2002). 



















































Mutual Monitoring (ingroup only)
 
Figure 9:  Punishment Levels in the Social Reciprocity Experiment Compared to 
the Mutual Monitoring Experiment (source:  Carpenter & Matthews, 2002). 
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Social Reciprocity Altruism Both
 
 
Figure 10:  Why do People Punish Outgroup? 
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